"After our Cassino engagement, we were removed and positioned o a high hillside in view of the famous Benedictine Monastery. Under command of our new C.P. General, memorable things happened on this hillside. Our moving in seemed rather slow and didn't shape up as realistically as our usual Hqs. setup and thereby drew a rebuke from our amiable C.O., John Heckert. One of my junior crew members spontaneously blurted out, "He must of got an ---chewing from higher eschelon!" Our answer to the rebuke was a sotless debri-free area ---amen."
"Enter the "booster" shell - The Germans were using a shell that also gave you the creeps. It was designed to propel its load in mid journey by use of a booster that had the sound of a sky rocket-swooooosh--when released from its carrier. If you didn't hear the "swoosh", look out!! It might drop on you."
"My "big boy", Hoffman, developed a perfect human fabrication of the sound of the incoming booster shell. He made use of this one morning at 10 A.M. as the Col. and his orderly were hoofing it through the area for the Col's A.M. coffee call. Midway in the area, Hoffman released his offering of the big shell. The Col. and orderly hit the turf like lead. As rapidly as he hit the ground, the Col. recuperated and his mild temperament dissolved into "Who the hell done that sergeant? You?" I accepted the blame and had to withould any smile or snicker. One of my men said "Heckert must have known the boss "Col." was going to hit the turf when he ordered the area policed extra clean". However, we didn't get any thanks from Col. Coyne. Years later in a letter to me, Col. Coyne asked if I remembered the whistling shell and I wrote to him saying I wasn't guilty. He wrote back that I had been forgiven long ago anyway."
"In the Col.'s diary you will note that he mentions the movement of a Piper Cub observation team which was just below our viewing area and in full view of what had been shelled previously by the Germans. In my patrol of the area, I noticed the Col. standing near a very sharp slope looking into the valley below. He motioned for me to come toward him. At this time the field had beeen in operation and was buzzing. He told me how vulnerable the location was for the planes. While conversing, we saw a phosphorous shell hit one corner of the landing field. Then, two - three - four all corners were hit. The 88's followed like trained dogs practically eliminating the entire Air Force of Cub planes. We thought we counted 12 when they were all in one piece. The Col. could not understand what stupid authority permitted the annihilation of the Piper Cub group. As a G.I., you passed it off as a war loss, but the Col. remarked that it was an unnecessary loss."
"Then our ringside seats for the bombing of the Benedictine Abbey. At this time we must explain the diverse opinions which were very few for the bombing. Most military men knew how the damaged Abbey would provide a perfect setup for the Germans to defend their positions, ezpecially since facts proved no German soldiers were occupying the Abbey. The only excuse applied to those who saw the movement which was exposed at the bombing and number of Italian civilians that rushed to their death trying to escape the bombs. Tey were seeking shelter in the Abbey and left on their own accord. The allies machine-gunned them because they first thought they were German soldiers. Prior to the bombing the allies sent leaflets asking the people to leave, but they did not all leave and as a result were wounded or killed. This unfortunate situation was an assist to German propaganda."
The bombing of the Abbey at Monte Cassino has for decades been a hotly debated subject. All the differing opinions of the allies were eventually put aside by Alexander and the bombing proceded. There are many good books written about the incident (check out "Cassino-Portrait of a Battle" by Fred Majdalany, Copyright 1957 Published by Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, England) but, one thing is for sure-after the bombing, for whatever reason, the push moved forward slowly and Monte Cassino was not taken until May of 44.
"In the early part of January, 1944, Gen. Alphonse Juin, the French expeditionary genius, offered an early opportunity to allies in "Big Cassino" - a plan to bypass Cassino and the Abbey. Gen. Keyes and Tucker both felt the plan a good one, however Mark Clark didn't; so, five months of attackes ensued. The allies were tormented with indecisions in the higher echelons and the decision to bomb the Abbey seemed to lean toward English demands. Alexander, in order to satisfy Freyberg of New Zealand, ordered the bombing. The Air Force C.O., Arnold, had received notes from Washington that reflected on Eaker, M.A.A.F., C.O. and his command in that the ground forces were being overly anxious in their efforts to satisfy. One bomb almost blew up General Clark and his trailer - 5 miles away from the Abbey - the bombing needed many ways of improvement."
"According to German high command, the Abby didn't disturb their was of life one bit, only confirmed their thinking as to how the Allies would continue their efforts --- straight ahead."
The Cassino portion of the Italian campaign is well covered in the History Channel documentary "Up The Deadly Boot-The Italian Campaign", available on DVD from the History Channel.